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SUITABILITY OF THE UNDERLYING THEORIES OF
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY IN ENSURING JUSTICE: LAYING THE
GROUND TO LOOK BEYOND THE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
LITON CHANDRA BISWAS*

ABSTRACT
Despite the dissatisfaction, distrust, and to some extent, abhorrence of a
considerable number of people, the zealous advocacy, without leaving any
space to any alternative model, has been playing the dominant role in the
adversary jurisdictions and “thoroughly dominates our thinking about legal
problem solving.” Surprisingly, however, the overwhelming trust on, and
bias towards, ZA are not based on any concrete justification. Rather, the
system is, to a certain extent, based on some unexamined theories. The
purpose of this Article is to examine the strength, correctness, or the
suitability of these theories with the concept of justice. This examination
will confirm whether there is any justification of the exclusive application
of the ZA model, irrespective of the nature of legal problems, in all cases,
even in the cases where the model completely fails and leads to tragedy.
This Article examines four broader theories: (1) Lawyers play an
avoidable role in the process of decision making by the courts and the
judicial system, which takes the decision; (2) A lawyer’s duty to the client
is equal or superior to his or her duty to the court; (3) Oppositional
presentation mechanism is the best way to reveal the truth; and (4) OPM is
the best model to protect democratic values and to ensure accurate
remedies. Detailed discussion of these theories reveals the incorrectness
and inappropriateness of these theories to the purpose of justice. In
consequence, the attempts to modify or to replace the zealous advocacy are
justified, and it creates an opportunity to look into the alternative models
which are likely to be more effective.

* Lecturer, Department of Law, Independent University, Bangladesh. [LL.B. (Hons’),
Stamford University Bangladesh; LL.M, University of Leicester]. I am grateful to Morgan
Wagner, Emily A. Donaher, and the editorial staff of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW for their
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Anglo-American jurisdictions, lawyers employ all of their skills and
knowledge to serve the interests of their respective clients at any cost. This
attitude of the lawyers is popularly known as zealous advocacy (“ZA”).
However, there is an everlasting dispute as to the acceptability of ZA; the
positive and negative aspects of ZA have been on the discussion table for
more than a century. In an attempt to contribute to the dispute and
understanding of the effect of the application of ZA, this Article begins with
the depiction of two scenarios.
A. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY SCENARIO NUMBER ONE
Twenty-year-old Natasha is a very well-behaved, calm, and rational
young woman who comes from a financially backward family. Twentyfive-year-old Jhony is, on the contrary, a rude, cruel, and aggressive young
man from a rich and influential family. Every day, Jhony stalks and teases
Natasha on her way to class. On several occasions, Natasha and her family
have brought the issue to the attention of the local authorities and have
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requested measures for her safety. However, nothing can stop the notorious
Jhony, as his father, an influential person, saves him every time. One day,
Jhony, along with his four friends, kidnap Natasha. They take turns
continuously raping her for two days, following which they brutally assault
her and then throw her on the highway. Later, she is rescued and charges of
kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder are brought against the suspects.
Jhony retains Mr. Jadal as his defense attorney. As far as the “concept
of zealous advocacy”1 is concerned, the lawyer and the accused must be in
a trusting relationship and have the understanding that the lawyer does not
need to know anyone but his client, whom he should represent zealously.2
According to this concept, Mr. Jadal holds the duty to save his client at any
cost, and, in doing so, he is permitted to use any means the client can
afford.3 The dominant view dictates that in order to prove the innocence,
justness, and inculpability of his client, Mr. Jadal can humiliate and
stigmatize the victim and her witnesses. In the process of stigmatizing the
victim, he can use every offensive, scandalous, and nasty weapon

1. The “concept of zealous advocacy” or “zealous advocacy” or “zealous advocacy model”
are hereinafter referred to as “ZA.”
2. Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client is Guilty:
Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
229, 235 (2009); Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1319, 1322 (2006) (quoting Lord Brougham who in Queen Caroline’s Case [1820] stated: “[a]n
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.”).
3. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 271 (2006) (“The duty of zealous representation calls for the
attorney to use all legal means to obtain a favorable outcome for the client, which can include
using tactics that lead a jury to conclude mistakenly that the person is not guilty of the offense,
because the government has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . ‘Indeed,
the prevailing view is that the lawyer is ethically required to do so.’”) (quoting MONROE H.
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 226 (3d ed. 2004)); Stephen
McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General
Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 315, 315 (1991) (“Acting as an
advisor, the lawyer certainly may, and arguably must, provide her clients with complete and
accurate advice, even when she reasonably believes that doing so will cause them to withhold or
suppress evidence. In litigation, the lawyer’s obligations of zeal and confidentiality require or
permit her to engage in a host of dubious activities: withholding evidence, even when the resulting
record is radically incomplete; presenting documents or testimony that she believes, based on
information unavailable to the tribunal, to be false; discrediting through cross-examination
witnesses she knows to be truthful; and arguing for inferences from the evidence that she knows
are unwarranted.”); United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (positing that a lawyers in his normal course of action “can confuse a
witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive.” Justice
White further states that defense counsel will cross examine and impeach a prosecution witness,
even if he or she knows that the witness is telling the truth); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind
of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1317 (1975); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4
STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1951) (stating that a lawyer should lie for the interest of his or her client).
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imaginable so that the victim loses her moral strength and fails to
effectively present her case.4 Consequently, the government (indirectly, the
victim) loses the case and is prevented from receiving the assurance of
justice, which is the sole purpose of law.5
B. ZEALOUS ADVOCACY SCENARIO NUMBER TWO
Harry, a young, energetic man and a devotee of democracy, organizes a
peaceful and non-violent demonstration with the support of a mass of
people to get rid of a dictatorial and tyrannical regime led by Douglas. The
movement, aimed at establishing democracy, is intensifying day by day. To
suppress the movement, the dictator, Douglas, with the help of his own
supporters, brings violence to an otherwise non-violent movement, which
leads to the death of innocent people. Although neither Harry nor any
supporter of that movement is involved in the deaths of those innocent
people, he is arrested and charged with murder. Despite oppositional
pressure from the government, lawyers driven by strong professionalism,
adversarialism, and democratic value spontaneously come forward to
defend Harry. Following the rules of ZA, the lawyers with the utmost
dedication to justice are succeeding to rebut the fabricated statements of the
government witnesses.
In order to take control of the case, Douglas threatens Harry, stating
that if Harry does not confess, his wife and children will be killed.6 To save
his beloved family, Harry falsely confesses in court. However, Harry’s
lawyer, honoring the principles of ZA, continues to defend him. Finally,
Harry’s lawyer who is inspired by Lord Brougham, fights against Douglas
with the infinite power of ZA and succeeds in defending his client’s case.
Both of the cases depict the immense strength and influence of ZA.
While the first case shows the immediate danger of ZA’s strength in
obstructing the path of justice, the second case shows its role in making the
path of justice smooth. To deal with the irregularities in the application of
ZA, numerous legal researches have argued in favor and against the system.
The opponents, predominantly media, popular culture, and scholarly
accounts based on general ethics, as opposed to legal ethics, have been

4. Nancy E. Snow, Evaluating Rape Shield Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail Rape
Victims, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE, 252 (Keith
Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999).
5. Although there is a debate as to the theory that the purpose of law is to ensure justice, for
the purpose of this Article the theory is considered as true.
6. Apart from facing a threat, innocent people may, mistakenly or for other reasons, confess
that they are guilty. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (1975).
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making an extreme effort to depict the shortcomings and inherent dangers
of ZA, whereas ZA advocates have been making efforts to defend it at any
cost.7 Despite the strong arguments for either side, a lawyer’s utmost zeal
to protect the interest of his clients has been the fundamental principle of
the adversary system,8 and the same has been considered as the “the
dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.”9 Despite the dissatisfaction,
distrust, and to some extent, abhorrence of a considerable amount of people,
ZA, without leaving any space to the alternative models, has been playing
the dominant role in adversary jurisdictions and “thoroughly dominates our
thinking about legal problem solving.”10
Surprisingly, however, the overwhelming trust on, and bias towards,
ZA are not based on any concrete justification. Rather, to a certain extent,
the system is based on several unexamined theories. The purpose of this
Article is to examine the strength, correctness, and suitability of these
theories in terms of the concept of justice. This examination will confirm
whether there is any justification for the exclusive application of the ZA
model, irrespective of the nature of the legal problem, in all cases, including
when the model fails completely and leads to tragedy, such as in the first
case discussed previously.11 To this end, the Article examines four broad
theories that lay the foundation of ZA, and later reveals that the theories are
not suitable for the purpose of justice. Consequently, attempts to modify or
replace ZA are justified, and these attempts create opportunities to look into

7. Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 248-53 (depicting the negative perception of ZA in
popular culture); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954 (2000) (pointing to a popular belief that “[l]awyers are
an avaricious lot who will bleed you dry”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 (1996)
(stating that the adversary system is not only inadequate, but also dangerous); Samuel D.
Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. LEG. PROF.
5, 7 (1980) (depicting the attitude of the common people as to the zealous rule stating that “[i]n
explaining to a layman the professional responsibilities of a lawyer one encounters almost
immediately the enigma of the adversary system, often referred to as the ‘sporting’ or ‘contest’
system. How can you defend a person you know is guilty? How can you justify one-sided
presentation if truth is the goal? Is not the search for truth subordinated to winning the law suit?
Is it not the duty of an attorney to do everything possible to further the client’s cause? Is the
lawyer merely a hired gun, a mouthpiece, a hired brain and voice? Is the system anything other
than a modern reflection of man’s inherent combative nature, a pageant necessitating professional
apology?”). But cf.id. (On the other hand, supporters of ZA believe that the rule is “the best
guaranty against the premature and biased decisions.”); Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory
of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1644 (2015) (stating that the supporters of ZA believe that it
plays an important role in advancing “human dignity, autonomy, due process rights, and clients’
trust and confidence in their lawyers”).
8. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at 1319.
9. Id.
10. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 25.
11. See supra Section I.A.
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the alternative models that are likely to be more effective. To utilize that
opportunity, this Article explores beyond the ZA model.
II. ZA THEORIES
Numerous theories are credited for the dominance and survival of ZA
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. These unexamined theories justify the
immense importance of ZA in ensuring justice and democratic values.
Thus, it may be said that the validity of ZA is subject to the validity of these
theories. Consequently, in order to determine the acceptability or necessity
of ZA, these theories must first be examined. Therefore, this Article
examines numerous interrelated theories.
A. THEORY NUMBER ONE: RESTRICTED INFLUENCE ON THE ACTIONS
OF LAWYERS - THE “SYSTEM DOES IT ALL”
Consciously or unconsciously, the promoters of ZA assume that the
consequences of lawyers’ actions in ensuring justice are very limited. They
point to the fact that the direct course of action of lawyers is filtered through
the system and that, at the end, a neutral judge makes the decision. ZA
proponents, therefore, assume that lawyers merely play a secondary or
indirect role in the decision-making process within the justice system.
According to this theory, the system plays the primary or direct role in
upholding justice and should, therefore, be allowed to make all decisions.12
Thus, despite being an integral part of the system, lawyers are separate from
it, especially in terms of the purposes that lawyers and the system aim to
serve.13 For example, one scholar is of the opinion that “[f]inding the truth
is the object of the judicial system, but it is not the governing principle for
the lawyer.”14 Therefore, the voice of the system is different than the voice
of the lawyers.
This theory is presumed to be incorrect, as it is unquestionably true that
lawyers play the most important and influential role in the adversary
system. This presumption can be confirmed if one understands the power a
lawyer has over a case. While traditional accounts assume that the judicial
system plays the main role in the decision-making process, the direct role of
lawyers in the formulation of that decision has been overlooked. Unlike the
12. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 9 (“[M]y job as a lawyer is not to judge the rights and
wrong of the client or the cause; it is to defend as best I can my client’s interests. . . . [T]rial is the
mechanism by which we determine in our society whether or not the person is in fact guilty.”).
13. Duncan Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 233, 244 (2008) (“Lawyers
are not the arbiters of justice — that is the role of the courts. While lawyers undeniably play an
important role in the judicial process, they are simply assistants to the court.”).
14. Henning, supra note 3, at 214.
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previously-described theory, the voices of the judicial system and of the
judges are at times or “most of the time,”15 intermingled with, or influenced
by, the voice of the lawyers. Lawyers can successfully mislead the court
and can affect the probability of winning a case.16 Sometimes judges do not
make their own decisions; instead, they make decisions based on what
lawyers want them to decide and, thus, lawyers are able to manipulate
judgments.17 In addition, it is important to not overlook the fact that there
are incompetent, or less competent, judges who are unable to stand up
against the fame of good lawyers, and, therefore, decide cases in favor of
those lawyers to minimize the risk of appeal.18 The overwhelming
importance of lawyers in the courts’ decision-making process is nicely
reduced into writing as follows:
[L]awyers are often—maybe usually—more than just legal
technicians. They shape deals and they make law. They invent
new forms of social life, they fill gaps, resolve conflicts and
ambiguities. They mold the law, through the process of legal
argument, in court, in briefs, in negotiations.19
In brief, borrowing the words of William Rich, it can appropriately be
said that “legal rules are designed to be administered by lawyers.”20
Because lawyers play the most important and influential role in the
functioning of the judicial system, it cannot be expected that the system

15. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 136 (2001).
16. Elisabetta Iossa & Bruno Jullien, The Market for Lawyers and Quality LawSyers in Legal
Services, 43 RAND J. ECON. 677, 680 (2012). Scholars Fuller and Randall rightly argue that a
lawyer “plays his role badly, and trespasses against the obligations of professional responsibility,
when his desire to win [to further his or her client’s interest] leads him to muddy the headwaters
of decision.” See David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 677 (2012) (reviewing
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010)) (quoting LON L. FULLER &
JOHN D. RANDALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-62 (1958)).
17. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 15, at 136-37 (“Most of the time, most judges consider the
competing legal meanings offered by the lawyers in a case and simply adopt one, albeit generally
with some modification, as that court’s official interpretation of the law. . . . And even when a
judge adopts her own interpretation, because lawyers frame the questions courts decide, the
lawyers will still have significantly influenced the law-building process, a role that extends far
beyond a particular client’s case.”); MICHAEL HEAD & SCOTT MANN, LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:
ETHICS, SOCIETY AND CRITICAL THINKING 1, 8 (2d ed., 2008) (“Particular defenders and
prosecutors have achieved great fame and fortune effectively manipulating judges and juries
through clever use of fallacious arguments”).
18. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 15, at 136-37; HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8.
19. Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes, 18 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1987).
20. William Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, BYU L. REV. 767, 783 (1980).
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would serve any purpose other than that of the lawyers; the voice of the
justice system is liable to be undermined by the voice of the lawyers.
To defend the theory that the “system does it all,” advocates prescribe a
second theory. The belief is that, at the end of the day, the voice of the
system will prevail because the opposing lawyer will neutralize or negate
the influence of his or her counterpart by using zeal.21 Accordingly,
Freedman justifies Lord Brougham’s position of extreme zeal in Queen
Caroline’s Case, by positing that zeal is not prejudicial to justice as “[t]here
is also an advocate on the other side and an impartial judge and/or jury
sitting over both.”22 The belief regarding the neutralization or negation of
lawyers’ influence during trial is based on a third theory that lawyers in
conflict are equally equipped and are of equal standard, ensuring balance
during trial and convenience for the judicial system to make its own neutral
decisions.23
Generally, this theory is not correct because, in practice, lawyers have a
varying capacity for reasoning, aptitude, and competence, which results in
parties not being on equal footing during trial.24 Factors such as legal
education, training, money, political influence, “natural barriers,”25 are
responsible for the variance.26 It is common for graduates from elite law
schools to be elite lawyers, whereas the graduates of “lower tier” law
schools are likely to be average, below average, or “storefront” lawyers.27
Similarly, training from, or affiliation with, large and reputable law firms
tends to produce highly competent and sophisticated lawyers.28
In addition, as Hadfield convincingly proves, “natural barriers” are
immensely responsible for the significant variance in levels of competence

21. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 10.
22. Monroe H. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, 2 J.
LEG. PROF. 47, 48 (1977); see also id. at 8-9 (assuming that opposing counsel has the ability to
“highlight, explain and refute such fallacious argument”); HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8-9
(assuming that opposing counsel has the ability to “highlight, explain and refute such fallacious
argument”).
23. United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (positing that a true adversary system deserves that both parties at trial are on
an equal footing); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22 (“In an ideal and abstracted form, the
adversary system clearly contemplates adversaries of equal skill and economic support. . . .”).
24. CLIFF ROBERSON & DILIP K. DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LEGAL
MODELS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34 (2008).
25. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 989 (A “natural barrier” means the barrier humans are born
into that affects “the underlying capacity of a particular individual to absorb and engage in a given
form of reasoning.”).
26. See generally Hadfield, supra note 7, at 972-94.
27. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 990.
28. Id.
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among lawyers from similar tiers of law schools and law firms.29
Consequently, a lawyer with fewer natural barriers than his or her
counterpart has a higher possibility of winning a case irrespective of the fact
that both have academic and training experience of similar standards. Other
relevant theories which claim that there is no best solution to legal
problems,30 that law is extensively complex,31 or that lawyers should aim
for winning at all costs,32 make the situation of unequal training and
experience even more complicated. These theories authorize a competent
lawyer to craft the web of arguments so wonderfully, and to such an
extreme extent, that he or she can make a castle in the air, and thus, win a
meritless case only by his or her personal competence.33 As a result, the
interest of the party having a more competent lawyer usually prevails over
the interest of the party with a less competent lawyer, and in this process the
judge would likely decide in favor of the party having the highly competent
lawyer. Therefore, it is worthwhile to quote a recent observation:
[H]iring a certified lawyer generates a decision-bias effect:
incompetent judges bias their decisions in favor of certified
lawyers, due to their reputational concerns. . . . Incompetent judges
then bias their decisions in favor of certified lawyers in order to
minimize the risk of appeals from certified lawyers and thus the
inference about their ability. . . . [H]igh-quality lawyers are able to
‘influence’ the trial outcome, by raising the chance of finding
evidence favorable to their case.34
In this reality, Rich cannot resist asking, “what happens to our concept
of justice if results really do hinge on the competence of the advocate and
not on the merits of the case?”35 It is not difficult to answer this question.
The cases’ outcomes, at least from a theoretical perspective, are in favor of
the parties that can afford to hire high-quality lawyers.36 Hiring a high29. Id. Menkel-Meadow’s observation in this regard is the same in that “even if we
equalized economic resources, an inequality in raw, legal talent might still exist in many cases.”
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 39.
30. Webb, supra note 13, at 239 (“Given the nature of legal problems and their practical
context, it can be shown that it is impossible distinguish between best solutions – even assuming
there is one.”).
31. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 995-96.
32. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8.
33. Rich, supra note 20, at 781 (emphasis added) (stating that “the lawyer’s competence and
effectiveness make a difference”).
34. Iossa & Jullien, supra note 16, at 678-79.
35. Rich, supra note 20, at 781.
36. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 956 (indicating that parties having more resources
overwhelmingly win cases); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22 (“In litigation, the unequal
resources of the parties will often determine the hierarchy of opposition.”).
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quality lawyer involves elevated legal costs and, consequently, financially
unprepared individuals fail to hire lawyers who can win most cases.37
Thus, the legal system “chooses the management of the economy over the
justice of social and political relationships as its central preoccupation.”38
Therefore, it would be no exaggeration to say that in access to justice, the
practice of law, extracted through liberal market economy, creates alarming
discrimination between the rich and the poor. Observing this situation,
Rich expresses his disappointment that “[f]or the wealthy [law] connotes
justice; for the poor it creates apprehension.”39
Therefore, in order to ensure justice to all, case decisions must not be
dependent upon the resources, skills, or competence of the lawyers “but on
the merits of the argument.”40 And, in order to avoid lawyers’ dominance
over the law and over the merit of cases, they must not be allowed to use
their competence for any purpose other than the purpose of the system
itself. Thus, the legal system’s key player, the lawyer, must speak in the
same voice as that of the system; his or her purpose and the purpose of the
system must be the same. Consequently, lawyers’ actions and the rationale
of those actions cannot be in any circumstance prejudicial to the concept of
justice; instead ensuring and promoting justice should be the sole
justification of lawyers’ actions.41 Justice Bokhary nicely states that the
purpose of law is justice, whereas the duty of lawyers is to serve this
purpose: “The pursuit of justice is the vocation of all lawyers, and every
worthwhile landmark of the law has been built upon this idea.”42 Thus, the
present theory, i.e., the “system does it all,” appears to be incorrect.
Consequently, lawyers’ actions are required to be in conformity with either

37. Iossa & Jullien, supra note 16, at 679; Rich, supra note 20, at 780 (stating that “[T]he
high price of professional litigation has driven a large segment of the middle income population
away from the courts.”).
38. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 1000.
39. Rich, supra note 20, at 780. In this point, Kennedy seems more disappointed. He
observes:
At present, the distribution of legal services is a disgrace: rich people get vastly more
than they need or deserve; middle income people can’t afford a lawyer in numerous
situations in which they are ripped off for relatively small amounts of money, or
discriminated against on sexual or racial grounds, or seriously injured. Poor people
have virtually no access to legal services, given the abysmal underfunding of the Legal
Services Corporation.
Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1162.
40. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22-23.
41. J. D. Heydon, Reciprocal Duties of Bench and Bar, 81 AUST. LAW J. 23, 26 (2007)
(citing Beavis v. Dawson, (1957) 1 QB 195, at 201 (Eng.) (Singleton LJ considers lawyer as the
helper in the administration of justice)).
42. Bokhary P. J., Justice and the Law: The Evolving Role of the Lawyer, 34 H.K. L.J. 133,
133 (2004).
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the system or the law. To end the discussion on this theory, it is worthwhile
to quote Kennedy:
You [addressing the lawyers] bear responsibility when your unique
way of molding the law, your work product, wins out to the
detriment of the community, even if it was not you, but a judge or
administrator who “pulled the trigger,” so to speak, by actually
deciding the case, and even if someone else would have done it if
you didn’t.43
B. THEORY NUMBER TWO: A LAWYER’S DUTY TO THE CLIENT IS
EQUAL OR SUPERIOR TO HIS OR HER DUTY TO THE COURT
Along with others, lawyers predominantly play two key roles: (1)
lawyers serve or represent clients with zeal and (2) lawyers serve the law or
act as an “officer of the court.”44 Proponents of ZA assume that the law
does not specifically prescribe which role will prevail when the two
conflict; therefore, zealous representation is justified until such zeal is not
prejudicial to the balancing of these two duties.45 The following words
exactly depicts the situation:
Existing theories of legal ethics contain an important and largely
unexamined assumption—that lawyers are simultaneously capable
of partisanship on behalf of clients while remaining sufficiently
objective to ensure that their own conduct is ethical. This
assumption, which is referred to here as the objective-partisan
assumption, can be found in all of the leading theories of legal
ethics.46

43. Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1161.
44. Trevor C.W. Farrow, Sustainable Professionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 51, 69-70
(2008); David A. Demers, The Continuum of Professionalism, 28 STETSON L. REV. 319, 319
(1998) (As an “officer of the court,” a lawyer’s duty is highly uncertain. However, for the
purpose of this Article, an officer of the court lawyer is to serve the purpose of law, i.e. “justice,”
and hence to act in “public interest.”).
45. Demers, The Continuum of Professionalism, supra note 44, at 319; Robert Bell &
Caroline Abela, A Lawyer’s Duty to the Court, ADVOC. SOC’Y J. 1, 4 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.advocates.ca/assets/files/pdf/bibliography/Duty_to_Court.pdf (last visited Aug. 9,
2016) (citing Gavin MacKenzie, The Ethics of Advocacy, ADVOC. SOC’Y J. 26-27 (Sept. 2008)
(stating that a lawyer’s duty to the court and to the client are equally important)). Bell and Abela
similarly state that “[w]hile facing financial and competitive pressures, lawyers must fulfil and
balance their duties to the client, opposing counsel, the administration of justice and society.” Id.
at 1.
46. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1643.
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In addition, strong proponents of ZA assume that a lawyer’s duty to the
client should not be subject to his or her duty to the court.47 For example,
McGillivray states that” [t]his is the essence of neutral [zealous] lawyering
– to have no interest other than those of the client and to prefer those
interests above all others.”48 Therefore, it appears there is no legal limit
placed on lawyers representing a client with zeal. In fact, this notion is
more popular and common than the previous notion.49 Patterson posits that
“[t]he prevailing notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty
of loyalty to the client is the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only
duty of the lawyer.”50 Glendon expresses a similar theory that “[l]awyers to
the interest of the client not to the law” and “[t]he only duty of the lawyers
to be loyal to the client.”51
Given the nature of the legal profession, attempting to balancing these
two duties may make the situation more complicated. The “objectivepartisan assumption” may be, at best, presumably based on a second theory
that to balance these two duties, lawyers can identify a line, if there is one,
or in the absence of such a line, draw one between the interest of the client
and the interest of justice.52 Perlman explains that the balancing theory
creates “difficulty identifying the line between permissible and
impermissible advocacy and that compliance with the dominant view will
result in misconduct more often than dominant-view proponents
acknowledge.”53
It seems that those assuming such are not aware of the catalysts that
control the lawyers’ behavior, and this unawareness leads to a groundless
theory. Perlman’s research convincingly depicts the immense influence of

47. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 673 (1978) (“When acting as an advocate for a client according to the Principle of
Professionalism, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means
used or the ends achieved.”).
48. Anne McGillivray, ‘He Would Have Made a Wonderful Solicitor’: Law, Modernity and
Professionalism in Bram Stoker’s Dracula, in LAWYERS AND VAMPIRES: CULTURAL HISTORIES
OF LEGAL PROFESSIONS 225, 247 (W. Wesley Pue & David Sugarman eds., 2003).
49. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 40 (1989).
50. L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909,
918 (1980).
51. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 60 (1996); see also McGillivray, supra note
48, at 247 (stating the essence of the zealous layering is that “to have no interest other than those
of the client and to prefer those interests above all others”).
52. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1646 (referring to WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (1998) in stating that “[t]he problem is that
Simon assumes that lawyers are capable of making objective assessments about whether their
conduct is consistent with the legal culture’s understanding of justice”).
53. Id. at 1641.
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partisanship, the prime derivative of ZA, on lawyers’ capabilities to make
justifiable decisions.54 He shows that partisanship, or the lawyer’s zeal to
his or her client, affects the lawyer’s perception.55 It can be argued that a
lawyer, irrespective of the demands of justice, perceives only those points
favorable to his or her client.56 On the other hand, lawyers are likely to
disregard valid claims of the opposing party because of their partisanship.57
Perlman asserts that the explanation behind such distortion of perception is
that:
[P]artisanship itself is a situational force capable of distorting a
professional’s perceptions, including judgments relating to legal
compliance. . . . So when we are placed in partisan roles, we tend
to filter information in ways that support that conclusion (i.e., the
conclusion favoring our clients). This effect complicates our
ability to make objective decisions, such as determining whether
our clients are complying with existing legal requirements. . . .
This effect is even stronger when people’s sense of identity and
self-worth is tied to their partisan stances.58
Thus, the argument is that a partisan lawyer is completely unable to
identify, or draw a line between his or her two key roles. This inability
places a lawyer “at a heightened risk of engaging in impermissible
behavior”59 and in a position prone to “make mistakes when determining
what is lawful, thus increasing the risk of crossing the line between
permissible and impermissible behavior.”60
Apart from this, there are other catalysts that prevent lawyers from
taking balanced steps to serve the interests of the client and of the law at the
same time. As previously discussed in the rebuttal to the first theory,
economic factors influence the market for legal practice because “the
practice of law is not apart from the economy.”61 Economic pressure,

54. See generally id. at 1651-57.
55. Id.
56. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1654, 1657 (stating that lawyers’ self-esteem and identity are so
intertwined with client-favorable outcomes that these lawyers may find it more difficult to assess
information that tends to undermine their clients’ positions); John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical
Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57 (2013) (“[T]he
very nature of lawyering encourages lawyers to interpret ethical rules to their benefit.”).
57. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21-22. This phenomenon is known as “reactive
devaluation,” the effect of which is that “[w]e do not hear the validity of a claim or argument or
offer made by ‘the other side’ simply because it comes from the other side.” Id. at 22 n.78.
58. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1655-56.
59. Id. at 1644.
60. Id. at 1661.
61. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 956.
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especially in liberal and self-regulating markets, contaminates a lawyer’s
decision-making ability and judgment which leads to his or her boundless
commitment to the client.62 Thus, at any cost, the lawyer attempts to win
the case for his or her client which may involve sacrificing his or her
commitment to justice or to the law.63 “[W]inning at all costs” is a
concomitant of ZA which deludes a lawyer into believing that he or she is
under a duty to further the unjustifiable interest of his or her client.64 In
addition, the intrinsic desire of human beings to succeed also drives a
lawyer to only further his or her client’s cause because, in the market of the
legal practice, the success of a lawyer is not measured in the balance of
justice, but by “money, prestige, and status.”65
However, the author believes that there is no practical necessity to
balance these two key roles as it is going to be seen that a lawyer’s duty to
the law is unquestionably superior to the duty to the client. Possibly, the
client supremacy or the ambiguity regarding the supremacy of roles is
fabricated and intentional. Promoters of this theory, especially lawyers,
intentionally nourish the dispute making it convenient to be more client
centered, while being less accountable to the system.66 There are instances
in which lawyers use the ZA model as a shield to defend violations of the
professional code of conduct.67 In addition, public misconception and
exaggerated depictions of extreme zeal in the media and literature have
made the lawyer’s role more complicated.68 Yet, it has been established
that serving the law to uphold justice is the lawyers’ prime duty, whereas
the duty to the client is second.69 Supremacy of law has been best
explained as follows:
62. Id; Perlman, supra note 7, at 1661.
63. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 1000.
64. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8 (“If a lawyer sees their role as that of ‘winning at all
costs’ [in fact, ZA shows the same] and they have little in the way of valid or strong logical
argument with which to do so, or believe that bad argument will be more effective than good in
convincing judge or jury, then they could come to believe that they have a responsibility to utilize
such bad reasoning. Such logically bad reasoning could be instrumentally or functionally good
reasoning from their perspective, or that of their clients.”).
65. Susan Swaim Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to EmpiricallyDerived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 567 (1998).
66. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 40 (“Indeed, the image of the lawyer as loyal advocate for the
beleaguered client is perpetuated by the bar itself. . . .”).
67. See generally Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the
Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 767, 769, 775-78 (2000).
68. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 40 (“More familiar to the public, and more comfortable to
lawyers, is the model of the lawyer as a ‘zealous advocate,’ the devoted champion of the client’s
cause . . . and reinforced by the media, in literature, and in common lore.”).
69. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8; Dzienkowski, supra note 56, at 75 (“[T]he duty of
zeal should not be allowed to be a justification for lawyer behavior that imposes significant costs
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[The advocate] has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a
mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say
what he wants or his tool to do what he directs. He is none of
these things. He owes allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause
of truth and justice. . . . He must disregard the most specific
instructions of his client if they conflict with his duty to the
court.70
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated:
An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his
obligations toward it before he ever had a client. His oath requires
him to be absolutely honest even though his client’s interests may
seem to require a contrary course. The lawyers cannot serve two
masters; and the one they have undertaken to serve primarily is the
court.71
Even Freedman, one of the strongest advocates of ZA,72 never denies
the supremacy of lawyers’ duty to justice; instead, he believes that there is a
lawful limit to ZA.73 While providing that a lawyer should take whatever
measures are required to “vindicate a client’s cause,” the ABA rules also
provide that the measures must be “lawful and ethical.”74
Moreover, some research that considers lawyers to be agents of either
the court or the client, also confirms the supremacy of law. For example,
Gaetke believes that a lawyer, as an officer of the court, is in fact an agent
of the court, or more broadly of the judicial system.75 On the other hand,
Daniel states that “[t]he lawyer-client relationship is one species of the

on the legal system and society in general.”); Bell & Abela, supra note 45, at 3 (“[A] lawyer may
not be able to act in a way that serves the client’s best interests if doing so would put the
administration of justice and the community’s confidence in the profession at risk.”); G.T. Pagone,
The Advocate’s Duty to the Court in Adversarial Proceedings (July 23, 2008),
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/VicJSchol/2008/10.pdf (citing Giannarelli v. Wraith, 165
CLR 543, 556-57 (1988) (confirming that barristers do have a duty to the administration of law
that goes beyond the duty to the client); Luban, supra note 18, at 677 (depicting Wendel’s belief
that lawyers’ “accountability runs to the law, not to individuals”).
70. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8 (citing Rondel v. Worsley (1967) 1 QB 443, 502).
71. JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE 254 (1995) (citing In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 275 NW 265, 268 (Neb.
1937).
72. Freedman’s overwhelming support for ZA is best depicted by his statement saying, “[l]et
justice be done—that is, for my client let justice be done—though the heavens fall.” MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975).
73. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at 1320.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
75. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 43.
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broad agent-principal relationship.”76 At the outset, it may seem that, in
terms of supremacy, Daniel and Gaetke have opposite positions. Indeed,
their positions differ as to whether the lawyer is the agent of the client or
the system, but this does not necessarily mean that there is confusion as to
which duty a lawyer shall perform. Either way, a lawyer must follow
agency law, and even if acting as the client’s agent, the lawyer’s actions are
subject to legal standards.77
Similarly, historical accounts of this issue support the presumption that
a lawyer’s duty to either the court or the system is never subordinate to his
or her duty to the client. For example, Gaetke shows that historically
lawyers have been servants of the law.78 In fact, the client supremacy
theory is historically boosted by a famous statement in the 1820s Queen
Caroline’s Case,79 claiming that in order to save the client, a lawyer can do
whatever he or she wants.80 However, another scholar, Wendel, believes
that this statement has no general applicability because it was a mere
political threat and “was never intended as maxim of legal ethics.”81
Further, two additional scholars, Zacharias and Green, claim that
Brougham, the author of Queen Caroline’s Case, repudiated the statement
on the ground that it was not deliberate.82 “In 1859, Brougham described
his famous speech as ‘anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered
opinion.’”83 Even Freedman, who considers Zacharias, Green, and Smith’s
claims of Brougham’s repudiation to be false, admits that Brougham never
intended to mean that lawyers who exercise zeal can cross the limit of the
law.84 Freedman further acknowledges that “neither Brougham nor anyone

76. Josiah M. Daniel, A Proposed Definition of the Term “Lawyering”, 101 LAW LIBR. J.
207, 213 (2009); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1107, 1128 (2013) (finding the same relationship).
77. Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 83 (2007)
(“[L]awyers arguably are just clients’ agents, in a strictly legal sense, and should act in accordance
with common law agency principles.”).
78. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 42 n.12 (citing G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 28-29
(2d ed. 1920) (stating that lawyers seem to be “[s]ervants at law of our Lord the King”)).
79. See Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2.
80. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham-Advocating at the Edge for Human Rights,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2007).
81. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 60 n.205 (1999).
82. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and WellConsidered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1221 (2006).
83. Tom Smith, Zealous Advocates: The Historical Foundations of the Adversarial Criminal
Defense
Lawyer,
LAW,
CRIME
AND
HISTORY
1,
10
(2012),
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/29074/1/Zealous_Advocates_The_Historical_Foundat.pdf.
84. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2.
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else has ever suggested that there are no lawful limits on zealous
advocacy.”85
C. THEORY NUMBER THREE: THE OPPOSITIONAL PRESENTATION
MECHANISM IS THE BEST WAY TO REVEAL THE TRUTH
In order to ensure justice, the fundamental and comprehensive
requirement is that the judgment must be founded on complete and definite
presentation of fact so that the truth is discovered.86 Defenders of ZA
assume that when two opposing parties speak, truth is revealed.87 They
claim that the Oppositional Presentation Mechanism (“OPM”) enables a
lawyer to employ, with extreme zeal, his or her skills, knowledge, and
tricks to destroy the credibility of the information and evidence produced by
opposing counsel.88 As a result, only true information and evidence
prevails, leading to an accurate decision.89 Some scholars believe that the
OPM decision is accurate because it enables the tribunal to receive a
complete account of the dispute, which “leads to a better evidentiary
record.”90 Further, these scholars believe that the competition generated by
the OPM “improve[s] the quality of information presented” by vigorously
attacking the unreliable information.91 Moreover, the OPM has been
considered a modern “bloodless” battle and has been said to replace
traditional bloody combat.92 This theory is explained as follows:
The adversary system proceeds from the assumption that the most
effective way to determine truth and to do justice is to pit against
each other two advocates, two adversaries, each with the
responsibility to marshal all of the relevant facts, authorities, and
policy considerations on each side of the case, and to present those
conflicting views in a clash before an impartial arbiter. In the
performance of that adversarial role, zealous advocacy is, of

85. Id.
86. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 316-17 (stating that “receiving a complete account of
dispute” or enabling the court to get the truth behind the dispute leads to accurate adjudication).
For the purpose of this Article, it is supposed that the identification of the truth is the prerequisite
for ensuring justice.
87. Thurman, supra note 7, at 8.
88. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 317–18.
89. Id. (stating that “[t]he lawyer’s zeal ensures that motivation is high, and competition from
the opposing counsel checks potential excesses and ensures that each party’s increased effort
enhances rather than impairs the accuracy of adjudication”).
90. Id. at 316.
91. Id. at 316–17.
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21.
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course, an essential element in producing an effective clash of
opposite views.93
Like the two previous theories, it can be argued that this theory is also
incorrect because the product of the OPM, belligerent lawyers, negatively
affects the whole system. The combative and aggressive nature of the OPM
is said to be responsible for the deterioration of the legal profession.94 This
is explained as the “unrestrained competitiveness driven by an obsessive
desire to win and a compulsive fear of losing.”95 The weakest point of this
theory is that it is designed to work in a binary oppositional world;
however, the binary oppositional model cannot correctly explain the
world.96 This theory can be explained as follows:
Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the
best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the
truth, leaves out -important information, simplifies complexity,
and obfuscates rather than clarifies. More significantly, some
matters-mostly civil, but occasionally even criminal, cases-are not
susceptible to a binary (i.e., right/wrong, win/lose) conclusion or
solution.97
Menkel-Meadow specifically and persuasively demonstrates that the
OPM distorts truth.98 Many others similarly observe that the OPM
“increase[s] confusion,”99 “retards discovery of truths,”100 and encourages

93. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22.
94. Steve C Briggs, The Myth and the Mischief of Zealous Advocacy, 34 THE COLO.
LAWYER 33, 34 (2005), http://coloradomentoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Briggs-S-TheMyth-and-Mischief-of-Zealous-Advocacy-34-The-Colorado-Lawyer-33-2005.pdf.
95. Briggs, supra note 94, at 33 (citing Michael Josephson, Ethics Beyond the Code, Speech
at the Colorado Bar Association Annual Meeting (Sept. 1994)).
96. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 6.
97. Id. Similarly, Thurman states that the model dissembles, distorts, and subordinates truth
to winning. Thurman, supra note 7, at 19.
98. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21–22 (observing that the OPM distorts the truth “by
making extreme claims, by avoiding any potentially ‘harmful’ facts, by refusing to acknowledge
any truth in the opposition,” by limiting storytelling to two, rather than allowing for a multiplicity
of stories, by refusing to share information, or, conversely, by strategically giving or demanding
too much information, “by manipulating information (as in the ‘battle of experts’), by making the
true look false (cross-examining a truthful witness) or the false look true (by offering false or
misleading evidence or by actively ‘coaching’ witnesses).”); Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 2,
at 243 (“The present system, of course, strongly motivates lawyers to avoid finding out the truth
and encourages smart clients to lie to their lawyers.”).
99. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 317.
100. Id. (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE: (1947)); Briggs, supra note 94, at 34; A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the
Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L. J. 921–59 (1978) (discussing how defense counsel in
criminal cases may suppress the truth).
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many lawyers “to subvert our adversary system into a mechanism for . . .
subverting justice, and treating others with incivility.”101
Most of the OPM loopholes become visible when one side of the
conflict has superior access to advice. Even the strong supporters of the
OPM acknowledge that when one party has superior access to legal advice
“competitive presentation does not invariably prevent or correct
inaccuracy.”102 They believe that “imbalances may have harmful or
doubtful effects, particularly because they increase the ability of the more
knowledgeable party to present false or prejudicial information and to
impose costs on her opponent.”103 Despite their unadorned response,
supporters do not accept the shortcomings of OPM; instead, they believe
that the accounts against OPM are “partial and simplistic.”104 This position
is reconfirmed in demanding that:
[W]hile advice has many disturbing or ambiguous informational
effects, on balance providing litigation advice to one or both
parties will generally increase the information reaching tribunals
and improve the capacity of tribunals to determine who deserves to
be sanctioned and who does not.105
The supporters of the OPM believe that the accounts criticizing it
unjustifiably evaluate the importance of the OPM by placing excessive
emphasis on the cases with one party having superior access to advice or
information; the accounts, as they believe, consider only those cases in
which parties have unequal access to advice.106 Generally, parties have
equal access to advice; the incidents of unequal access are exceptions.107
While people tend to present favorable information and suppress
unfavorable information, lawyers are generally competent enough to “detect
and sanction opponent suppression.”108
However, this theory appears to be incorrect because in the discussion
of the first theory, it was depicted that parties are generally not on equal
footing because of parties’ inability to hire lawyers of equal competence. In
reality, parties will never be on equal footing. Aside from a lawyer’s
competence in presenting and suppressing information, the ability of a
client or witness to present or suppress information and their ability to
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Briggs, supra note 94, at 34.
Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 415.
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successfully defend cross-examination also makes a significant difference.
For example, suppose that the victim in case number one can afford to be
represented by the highest quality lawyer, whereas the accused is only
represented by an average lawyer. Here, the accused will present less
favorable information than the victim.
Finally, it is worth noting that “[p]erhaps the distortions of modern
verbal combat have outlived their usefulness and we can evolve to the next
level-a combat-less legal system.”109
D. THEORY NUMBER FOUR: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO ZEALOUS
ADVOCACY
ZA is considered fundamental or cornerstone to the adversary
system.110 The survival of the adversary system is predominantly
dependent on the theory that to ensure justice, the adversary model coupled
with ZA is best suited to the purpose and there is no alternative to the
unique companion that can replace either of these two. Even MenkelMeadow, who is completely aware of the serious drawbacks of ZA, is
afraid of the probable risks involved in the alternative models.111 The
theory is justified on the grounds that the unique companion is best suited to
the survival and prosperity of democracy and to the question of ensuring the
most appropriate and effective remedy.112
Those who believe this theory also believe that lawyers are the most
important democratic role players or political agents; the guardians of
democracy.113 Lawyers can best play this political role when ZA is in
place. In fact, zealousness is considered as “the foundation of some of the
most important values in our system of government.”114 Zealous advocates
play this important role in two ways. First, advocates provide legal services
to everyone irrespective of whether the client is guilty or innocent.115

109. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21.
110. LAWRENCE J. FOX, SUSAN R. MARTYN & ANDREW S. POLLIS, A CENTURY OF LEGAL
ETHICS: TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 80 (2009).
111. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that “we know that any system that we
might substitute for it would have other, perhaps worse, flaws for those who fear the power of
state investigators, or the absence of clear standards or governing rules in private dispute”).
112. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57,
63 (1998); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding,
61 DUKE L. J. 1, 3-4 (2011); Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversarial System, 40
LOY. L. A. L. REV. 653 (2007).
113. Luban, supra note 16, at 676 (stating that “a legal system is a political institution that
serves indispensable political ends. . . . The lawyer’s obligations are political obligations.”).
114. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22, at
48.
115. Rich, supra note 20, at 781.
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Second, advocates prevent the government from exercising coercive
practices or, at least, by making the government responsible for its actions
in court.116
“Lawyers represent both sides in a controversy regardless of whether
one side is ‘good’ or the other ‘bad.’”117 Referring to the democratic role of
the lawyers, one scholar posits that it is the constitutional duty of the lawyer
to represent the accused.118 The whole concept is that everyone has a
constitutional right to be represented to ensure justice for all.119 Lawyers
are responsible for ensuring “true equality before the law” and “for the state
to be subject to the ordinary law of land.”120 Similarly, the system
empowers “one or more citizens to call the government itself before the bar
of justice.”121 A threat to ZA would be against both civil liberties and the
public interest.122
The basis of the theory that lawyers are democratic role players lies in
the political and judicial conditions of the period when ZA was in the
introduction and development process. “Dangerous social and political
unrest”123 and excessive government interference in the administration of
justice contributed to the creation of ZA.124 ZA is justified because it
originated during a time when various troubling elements in the
administration of justice were underplayed. In particular, the government
“would often target the vulnerable, fabricate offences, bring a prosecution
and reap the rewards of a wrongful conviction.”125 This is nicely depicted
as follows:
[T]he importance of the ‘full defence’ principle clearly emerged in
reaction to the substantial flaws evident in the criminal justice
system: the systematic abuse and repression of the rights of
prisoners, the one-sided nature of criminal trials in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries; the exploitation of prosecution for profit

116. Webb, supra note 13, at 243.
117. Rich, supra note 20, at 781.
118. Thurman, supra note7, at 15.
119. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22, at
48 (Freedman is of the opinion that ZA protects the dignity of the individual, “even when the
[individual] is known by the state to have committed a heinous offence.”).
120. Webb, supra note 13, at 243.
121. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22, at
49.
122. Id.
123. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at 1320.
124. McGillivray, supra note 48, at 247 (stating that lawyers' “concrete response to the
exercise of state power” gave rise to the emergence of the ZA).
125. Smith, supra note 83, at 7.
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by thief-takers and solicitors . . . it appeared that a ‘full defense’
was required to remedy these issues.126
Based on this assertion, “graymail” is justified,127 though, it is likely
most important when there is a repressive government.128 When the
circumstances are stable and peaceful, graymail may have little importance;
instead, in sensitive cases, it may be harmful.129 In fact, where judicial
independence is guaranteed, there is only a slight possibility that the
government may interfere with the administration of justice.130
Furthermore, the author observes that in most cases, politics has no direct
connection to the subject matter of the case and the number of cases in
which the accused is charged based on a political motive is limited.
Therefore, in scenario number one, exercising zeal against the victim will
likely prevent justice rather than promote it.
In addition, the claim that no other system is as effective as ZA’s
embedded adversary system in “protecting individual dignity and
autonomy,”131 is incorrect as it is established that the proper application of
alternative models, like the investigatory model, ensures more protection.132
There are other systems like “[t]he inquisitorial system of civil law
countries, the mediation of Asian countries, the dispute resolution processes
of Native Americans, and the ‘moots’ of some African cultures” and these
systems each have “something to teach us.”133
On the other hand, the theory that zeal ensures the best remedy is the
by-product of the OPM. It has already been observed that the OPM, as
theorists claim, enable the tribunal to receive a complete account of the
dispute and “enhances rather than impairs the accuracy of adjudication.”134
Eventually, theorists claim an accurate adjudication leads to an accurate
remedy. However, from the beginning, the theory proves to be wrong
126. Smith, supra note 83, at 16–17.
127. The term graymail “refers to a threat by a criminal defendant to reveal, in the course of
the defense, information that is harmful or embarrassing to the government, in order to induce the
government to drop the charges.” Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at
1320.
128. Id.
129. Richard P. Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information
Procedures Act, 98 YALE L. J. 427, 429 (1988).
130. Thomas E. Plank, Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the Experience of
Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 6 (1996). In addition, without reliable data
to this regard, taking the instances of the inquisitorial jurisdiction may support this point.
131. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.
J. 301, 302 (1988).
132. Friendly, supra note 3, at 1290 (stating that the investigatory model also ensures the
protection of individual and the proper application of it ensure more protection).
133. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 28 (footnote omitted).
134. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 317–18.
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because it has already been revealed in the discussion of the third theory
that the OPM does not necessarily enhance the accuracy of adjudication.
Furthermore, since ZA tends to be based on negative qualities such as
distrust,135 hostility,136 and combativeness, it may, at best, give a conflict
time remedy. This kind of remedy is exclusionary,137 reactive,138 and
unaccommodating. These shortcomings are equally observable in practice.
In cases involving issues such as divorce, guardianship, and estates the
exclusionary model destroys the likelihood of reaching to an
accommodating solution.139 The devastating effect of the exclusionary
model can be explained as follows:
[T]he adversary process infuses the parties with the same spirit of
adverseness and depersonalization . . . it can also serve to
deteriorate the parties’ underlying relationship. A graphic example
regularly occurs in divorce law. Many a couple reconciled to
separation has been driven to hostility by the maximum demands
asserted by their spouse’s lawyer. The typical response is: “If
(s)he’s going to try to wipe me out, then I’m going to fight over
the kids.”140
Thus, the negative characteristics of ZA close the doors to mutual
understanding, cooperation, and compromise, which are prerequisites for an
equally beneficial solution to each party.141 However, “[l]itigation is often
unnecessary and potentially destructive.”142 Unfortunately, ZA does not
leave any space for this realization because a remedy is only accurate when
filtered through combat involving lawyers. As a result, ZA destroys the
option of settling a legal dispute more effectively without involving costly,
time consuming, and stressful litigation. This is why ZA might “cultivate
evil.”143
It has become clear that none of the theories are correct on which the
grand theory depends (i.e., that ZA is the best model). Therefore, it appears

135. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the Adversary System: The
Enduring Problems of Distrust, Misunderstanding, and Narrow Perspective, 27 VAL. U. L. REV.
313 (1993).
136. Rich, supra note 20, at 782.
137. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. ZA-based remedies are exclusionary in
the sense that they exclude the losing party, exclude a third party who is directly affected, exclude
open thinking, exclude relationships, and exclude other positive values. Id.
138. See Rich, supra note 20, at 768.
139. Id. at 782.
140. Id.
141. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 6-10.
142. Rich, supra note 20, at 767.
143. McGillivray, supra note 48, at 247.
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that the theory claiming the immense importance of lawyers in protecting
democratic values in every case is an exaggeration, and the theory
predicting the best remedy is not well-grounded. In addition, even from the
stakeholder’s perspective, i.e., lawyers, clients, and society, the ZA model
has substantial drawbacks. For example, in 1993, a Legal System
Dynamics Subcommittee of the Professionalism Committee, reported that
zealousness is responsible for the increased lack of professionalism among
lawyers.144 The reality is that ZA is being used as a shield to justify
negative characteristics of the legal practice, such as paranoia,
deceitfulness, insensitivity, and the utmost desire to promote the client’s
interest regardless of whether it is justified.145 Therefore, should ZA be
continued in its current form, “lawyer[s] will be encouraged to be
competitive rather than cooperative; aggressive rather than accommodating;
ruthless rather than compassionate; and pragmatic rather than
principled.”146
III. LOOKING FOR REFORM IN THE ZA MODEL AND BEYOND
“Adversarialism is so powerful a heuristic and organizing framework
for our culture, that, much like a great whale, it seems to swallow up any
effort to modify or transform it.”147 It is apparent, however, that the ocean
of theories in which the “great whale” lives has been dried out. For
example, scholars have already begun to realize the necessity of alternative
models.148 Realizing the necessity of modification, the adversary system
“must constantly be reexamined and defined in the light of today’s
world.”149 Reform in the traditional ZA model is inevitable because it has
become outdated compared to the “many functions of a modern lawyer.”150
Even strong supporters of ZA acknowledge the importance of its
reformation:
We do need reform. We need reform to make the adversary
system function better, to inform people about their rights and
about how to vindicate them, to ensure effective representation on

144. Briggs, supra note 94, at 38.
145. Daicoff, supra note 65, at 560.
146. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 13.
147. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 40.
148. Id. at 43 (“I firmly believe that the only way to reform the adversary model is to
successfully ‘oppose’ it with other modes and processes and see if we can create a more varied
legal system, one that is more sensitive to the particular postmodern needs of parties and the
particularities of cases”); Perlman, supra note 7, at 1663.
149. Thurman, supra note 7, at 7.
150. Dzienkowski, supra note 56, at 57.
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both sides of every case, and to provide competent judges in all
cases.151
Thus, it is well-grounded and timely to demand the reevaluation of ZA
in the guarantee of justice. In fact, scholars, ranging from strong critiques
to strong supporters of ZA, have already started to prescribe measures
required to deal with the shortcomings of ZA. Strong critiques of ZA
suggest that lawyers should essentially look at the interest of law, and, to
this end, ZA needs to be replaced by other appropriate models.152 One such
critique prescribes that lawyers should not even take on a case when
denying the case is better for the society or when it is apparent that the
client may use the lawyer’s skill to do harm.153 Similarly, Professor
Wendel opines that lawyers should not represent all causes of a client, even
if permitted to do so by law.154 Instead, lawyers should only pursue client’s
substantiated “legal entitlements.”155
Conversely, supporters of weak adversarialism believe that ZA should
remain in action to the extent that it serves justice. One scholar, William
Simon, suggests a discretionary model where the issue of advancing a
client’s unjustified claim is left to the discretion of the lawyer,156 expecting
the lawyer to exercise discretion to promote justice.157 In contrast,
however, other scholars, Asimow and Weisberg, take slightly different
positions, desiring a compromise between strong and weak
adversarialism.158 According to their prescribed model, a defense attorney
must not perform at his or her best unless the defendant is subject to “wildly
excessive punishment,” and then a “full-throttle” defense is permitted.159
However, when considering different facts in different cases, there is
no justification for viewing all cases from the same point of view, because
legal problems and remedies in two cases are never the same. The same
rationale applies in that the amount of zeal required in a criminal case is not

151. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22, at
54.
152. Andrew Boon, Re-Conceiving the Lawyer’s Role and the Foundations of Legal
Professional Ethics, JOTWELL (2013), http://legalpro.jotwell.com/re-conceiving-the-lawyers-roleand-the-foundations-of-legal-professional-ethics/?pfstyle=wp.
153. Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1160 (explaining that lawyers “should avoid doing harm
with [their] lawyer skills even if there is someone else waiting to take [their] place”).
154. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1645.
155. Id.
156. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1145
(1988).
157. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1646.
158. Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 54.
159. Id.

86

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92: 61

the same amount required in a civil case.160 It is also important to note that
ZA may have importance in some cases, yet obstruct the path of justice in
other cases.161 Therefore, it would be a mistake to believe that a single
model, such as extreme ZA, weak adversarialism, or balanced ZA, alone,
would effectively solve all problems.162 There is no reason to prescribe the
same antibiotic for all kinds of bacteria; rather, different antibiotics, in
different dosages are to be administered to deal with different types of
bacteria. In order to ensure justice and effectively and appropriately deal
with legal problems, all models should be taken into account and then the
best suited model should be applied.163 For example, the multi-story-telling
model should be applied when appropriate, “permit[ing] more voices, more
stories, more complex versions of reality to inform us and to allow all
people to express views that are not determined entirely by their ‘given’
cultural identities.”164 This model may provide the best solution in cases
relating to comparative negligence or business necessity defenses.165
The author believes that in its extreme form, traditional ZA may be
used in cases with powerful parties, like multinational corporations, states,
political parties, or other entities that can influence the outcome of trial on
the prosecution side, and thus, may pose a threat to democratic and political
values. In such cases, there may be political lawyers who deal with cases
involving states or other politically influential parties. This kind of lawyer
will likely have the privilege of doing whatever he or she wants to serve the
client’s interests, and will be the only lawyer allowed to resort to extreme
zeal.
In other cases, however, ZA may be applied if modified. For example,
in the “Damini Rape Case,”166 a main point was that one of the five

160. Dzienkowski, supra note 56, at 75 (stating that in criminal cases the role of zeal is
especially important).
161. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 24-27 (stating that “binary solution” or
the competitive representational model is not necessary in every case).
162. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1663 (stating that “rather than prescribing the same conduct in
every situation (e.g., pursuing the client’s interests to the full extent the law allows), theorists
should acknowledge that lawyers need to adopt a different mindset”).
163. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 11 (“[W]hat I would substitute for [the dominant ZA
system] I have no one panacea, solution, or process to offer-instead, I think we should
contemplate a variety of different ways to structure process in our legal system”).
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Profiles: Delhi gang rapists, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-india-23434888; see also Niharika Mandhana & Anjani Trivedi, Indians Outraged
Over Rape on Moving Bus in New Delhi, INDIA INK (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:01 AM),
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/outrage-in-delhi-after-latest-gang-rape-case/?_r=0; see
also India gang rape bus driver arrested in Delhi, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:45 AM),
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defendants was a minor who required special protection under juvenile
law.167 In a case in which the accused and the victim are vulnerable,
modified or weak ZA may be used. The accused gets the benefit of ZA in
the sense that the defense attorneys exercise zeal in the client’s interest but
will not “actively mislead the court”168 or attack on the victim. Instead of
exposing victims to the harsh behavior of defense attorneys, he or she may
be separately cross-examined to ensure comfortability and privacy.
Alternatively, to avoid gender-based discomfort, this type of case may be
tried jointly by a team of male and female judges.169 In addition, the impact
of cross-examining a female victim by a female lawyer in front of a female
judge may be considered.
In cases with a number of aggrieved parties, an inquisitorial system is
more and appropriate than an adversarial system. Therefore, cases
involving issues of mass justice, such as environmental and consumer
litigation, or personal injury claims arising from industrial disease, may be
solved under the inquisitorial system. One model, largely influenced by the
inquisitorial system, suggests:
Under such a model the “judge” would assume a much more active
role with respect to the course of the hearing; for example, he
would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed,
request that certain types of evidence be presented, and, if
necessary, aid the parties in acquiring that evidence.170
Farrow proposes another model which, at the outset, seems absurd and
whimsical, but it may work well if applied to cases related to the dissolution
of marriage, settling a guardianship issue, divorce, or partition. Under this
proposal, the lawyer takes on all clients, and instead of pursuing their
unjustified causes, he or she will later try to convince the client to pursue
the justified cause.171
To find an effective remedy to mitigate the impact of the differences
opposing lawyers face in skill or capacity, one scholar wittily asks, “Should
we assign lawyers to cases on a random or lottery basis?”172 Inspired by
this question, the author would like to imagine a model that may be applied

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9752301/India-gang-rape-bus-driverarrested-in-Delhi.html.
167. Id.
168. Bell & Abela, supra note 45.
169. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
170. Friendly, supra note 3, at 1289.
171. Farrow, supra note 44, at 100 (explaining that “the lawyer may choose to take on the
client but then try hard to persuade the client to pursue a different course of action”).
172. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 39.
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when there is a lesser possibility of abuse by the lawyers. Accordingly,
lawyers would not choose the client, instead a lawyer or government
association would distribute the cases blindly to lawyers who would be
required to defend their client to the greatest extent permitted by law. Then,
a ranking would be made based on the success rate of each lawyer. A
lawyer would then have the option to reject a case if it was found to be
meritless; thus, contributing to the success rate. Upon rejection, other
lawyers, at their discretion, would be permitted to take the case at their own
risk of reducing the success rate. If the new lawyer succeeds, the lawyer
who rejected the case would be discredited. In response, however, the
question must be raised as to the clients’ freedom to choose desired counsel,
because a client may not be comfortable with sharing his or her case with
all lawyers. In that situation, a client may be asked to provide a list of
acceptable lawyers, and then, one lawyer from the list may be assigned.
In addition to classifying cases and selecting different models, the
author is of the opinion that some ground rules should be set and followed,
with violations leading to punishment including disbarring the violating
lawyer. For example, in all cases, no lawyer should be allowed to willfully
deny the points of law brought forth by opposing counsel, because the
denial is disgraceful to the spirit of law.173 The following suggestion may
be taken as an important ground rule. “Instead of attempting to destroy the
testimony it would be better to refrain from impeaching the truthful witness
and to trust the trier of fact to draw the right conclusions.”174 An additional
ground rule may be that “[a] lawyer should not unreasonably raise or defend
an action for which there is no legal justification.”175 Also, there is a
necessity to set ground rules to prohibit lawyers’ rude, harsh, and
aggressive behavior in the courtroom.176 Lawyers may be required to
receive more training, counseling, and to pass advanced eligibility exams so
that it is ensured that they can technically, rationally, and gently without
stigmatizing the victim, bring out the truth.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rabbi Harold L. Kudan states: “[t]hat which dominates our imagination
and our daily thoughts will determine our life and character. Therefore, it

173. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247
(2005).
174. John T. Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH.
LAW REV. 1485, 1487 (1966).
175. Bell & Abela, supra note 45.
176. Norman L. Greene, Perspective on Temper In the Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility,
23 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 709 (1995).
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behooves us to be careful what we are worshipping, for what we are
worshipping we are becoming.”177 Understandably, in the ZA context,
Kudan’s statement is correct. Despite having no conclusive justification,
ZA dictates our consciousness, our minds, and our actions because we
worship it. We worship ZA because we assume that the exclusionary
model is best to deal with all types of legal problems. Until a system is
proven groundless, meritless, ineffective, less effective, or prejudicial, there
is nothing wrong with worshiping or having faith in any system; it is instead
required for the functioning of that system. However, as argued in this
Article, the underlying theories of ZA are groundless and sometimes the
system gives rise to prejudicial decisions in pursuit of justice; therefore,
there is no reason to worship or stick to ZA as a solution to all legal
problems. Instead, it is more appropriate to believe that, in addition to ZA,
there are other options. Bearing in mind there are variations in the nature,
context, subject-matter, and remedy sought in legal problems, all options
should be examined so that the best suited models for a particular type of
legal problem can be identified.
To this end, extensive engineering is required to deal with legal
problems of a different nature; a series of analytical works from the micro
level, instead of macro level, are urgently required. As explained in
previous sections of this Article, different models, questions, hypotheses,
and possibilities may be explored. It is then necessary to conduct an
extensive study on each of these models in relation to the different types of
cases. All of the alternative systems must be put on trial to determine
which mechanism produces the most appropriate remedy for a particular
kind of case by introducing a scientific trial and error mechanism. Like the
periodical table of elements used by a chemist, a lawyer may need to
maintain a detailed chart or database enlisting the wide variety of
circumstances and factors related to legal problems. Like a microbiologist
who conducts his or her research deep into the microscopic details of a cell,
a legal scholar must enter into the hair-splitting details of the human mind
to ascertain responses in different circumstances and to identify the
elements that affect those responses.

177. Briggs, supra note 94, at 34.

